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THE DETERRENT EFFECTS OF THE





In the area of firearms policy, no measure has received more legisla-
tive attention than mandatory minimum sentences for felonies commit-
ted with a gun. At the latest count, fifteen states had adopted such a
law, and a dozen or so more were considering it. I On the national level,
the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime has recommended
mandatory minimum sentencing for federal crimes committed with fire-
arms.2 There are many reasons for the popularity of the policy, but one
of its more important attractions is the expectation that mandatory min-
imum sentences will reduce gun-related crime without imposing addi-
tional constraints on the behavior of "law-abiding" citizens who wish to
own guns.
In previous studies we investigated the effects of mandatory
sentences for gun felonies on violent crime in Detroit, Michigan, con-
* The research reported here was supported in part by grants 79-NI-AX-0094 and 81-IJ-
CX-0060 from the National Institute of Justice. Points of view or opinions stated are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the United States
Department of Justice. We would like to thank Matthew R. DeZee for advice on criminal
statistics in Florida and for assistance in obtaining data. Bill Bowers and Glenn Pierce made
a substantial contribution to this project by providing the data and valuable criticism. Brian
Wiersema and Stephen Schmaltz also assisted with the analysis.
** Associate Professor, Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Mary-
land. Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1971; M.A., University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1966; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1964.
*** Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, State University of New York-Buffalo.
Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1980; M.A., Northwestern University, 1975; B.S., Portland
State University, 1973.
1 See R. MORELLI, C. EDELMAN & R. WILLOUGHBY, PENNSYLVANIA COMM'N ON CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY, A SURVEY OF MANDATORY SENTENCING IN THE U.S., Table 1 at 7
(1981).
2 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME:
FINAL REPORT 29 (Recommendation 17) (1981). Recommendation 5 in Phase I and Recom-
mendations 17 through 22 in Phase II address firearm policy. See id.
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cluding that there were no discernible changes in the level of crime
which could be attributed to Michigan's gun law.3 In this Article we
extend the analysis to Florida's version of the law by examining its effect
on violent crime in three cities in that state.
II. BACKGROUND
The Florida Felony Firearm Law4 went into effect on October 1,
1975. 5 It mandates a "flat" three-year sentence for possessing a firearm
while committing or attempting to commit any of eleven specified felo-
nies. Suspended, deferred, and withheld sentences are explicitly prohib-
ited, as is parole, until the minimum three years have been served.
6
The Florida statute enjoyed great popular support and was the sub-
ject of an extensive media campaign before its passage. Supporters of
the law felt that its "ironclad" guarantee of a three-year sentence would
deter many offenders.7 In addition, a prominent theme in the press re-
3 Loftin & McDowall, 'One With a Gun Gets You Two- AlandatoVy Sentencing and Firearms
Violence in Detroit, 455 ANNALS 150 (1981); Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, AMandatoVy Sentenc-
ing and Firearms Violence in Detroit: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17 LAw & SOc'y REV.
301 (1983).
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.087(2) (West 1976).
5 Some of the elements of the law were in effect before this time, but according to Ku,
Florida The 1975Firearn Law, in AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS Vol. IV 39-52 (J. Mullen ed.
1980), the Florida Department of Correction designated October 1975 as the effective date.
This date is cited in the news coverage as the effective date for the law and it corresponds to
the period of the publicity campaign about the law. See Harrison, 14-Aonth-Old "S-To-Life'
Law Held Successful, Orlando Sentinel Star, Dec. 12, 1976, at A18, col. 1.
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.087(2) (West 1976) provides:
Any person who is convicted of any murder, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, arson,
aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping, escape, breaking and entering with
intent to commit a felony, or aircraft piracy, or any attempt to commit the aforemen-
tioned crimes, and who had in his possession a "firearm," as defined in subsection
790.001(6), or "destructive device," as defined in subsection 790.001(4), shall be sen-
tenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years. Notwithstanding the provisions
of § 948.01, adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, de-
ferred, or withheld, nor shall the defendant be eligible for parole, prior to serving such
minimum sentence.
7 Harrison, 14-Month-Old '3- To-Life'Law Held Successful, Orlando Sentinel Star, Dec. 12,
1976, at A18, col. 1. To make sure that the threat got across, they organized a massive public-
ity campaign supported by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and
orchestrated by a professional public relations firm. The campaign included radio and televi-
sion spots, 200 billboards, press releases, public speaking engagements, and posters placed on
the doors of high-risk establishments. See Ku, supra note 5; Dillin, Mandato.7Jailfor Gun Toters:
How Eective?, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
Senator James Glisson, author of the statute, felt strongly that the publicity campaign
was the key to the success of the law. He argued that the best way to make the law effective
would be "to get the word to people inclined to do this kind of thing, that if they use a gun
when they break the law, punishment will be swift and certain . . . and they mustn't have
any doubts about it." Harrison, supra note 7, at A18, col. 1. Before the law went into effect
and before the information campaign, a survey of Florida residents between the ages of 16
and 25 found that only 19% had heard of the law. See Barbour & Monroe, Executive Sum-
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ports about the law was indignation over well-intended but naive poli-
cies of the past that stressed rehabilitation rather than deterrence.8
Although no systematic evaluation of the deterrent effect of the law has
been done, it is widely believed to have produced dramatic reductions in
such crimes as armed robbery and assault.9 In Michigan, where a simi-
lar statute was being implemented, news of the apparent success of the
Florida law was widely circulated in the media. 10
Given the apparent failure of the Michigan law to reduce violent
gun crime in Detroit, i ' the success of the Florida law would be espe-
cially interesting because it might suggest conditions and policies that
enhance or diminish the success of mandatory sentencing. Therefore,
we conducted an evaluation, similar in most respects to the earlier study
in Detroit, of the preventive effect of the Florida gun law.
mary: Attitudes and Opinions of Persons 15 to 25 Regarding Hand Gun Control (Nov. 1975)
(Barbour and Monroe Marketing Research, Orlando, Florida) (unpublished report). We
have been unable to find a comparable study after the information campaign. Ku, supra note
5, at 41, mentions a figure of 49%, but does not describe the source or the sample. Burr's
survey of convicted felons in five Florida correctional facilities found that 79% were aware of
the law. See E. BURR, FLORIDA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE,
FINAL REPORT: HANDGUN REGULATION Appendix 4-11 (1977).
8 Glisson said, "Everybody was thinking in terms of 'How is this going to help in terms of
rehabilitation?' and we said 'it's not!'. . . . It's intended as plain old hardcore punishment
. . . retribution, which equals deterrent." Harrison, supra note 7, at A18, col. 1.
A similar theme was sounded by Jim Barrett, assistant to the attorney general in Florida:
"Punishment in and of itself should not be discarded as a form of rehabilitation. A pat on the
head simply hasn't worked in the past. Maybe we should try a kick in the ass." Neubacher,
Prison-for-Gunmen Law Will Get State Test Soon, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 30, 1976, at A3.
9 Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, supra note 3, at 304. Ku's brief assessment of the im-
pact of the law on the Florida prison population parallels some of the effects of the Michigan
law: "Admissions to prison have not increased ... while the three year minimum term for
those sentenced under the statute may be substantially longer than would have been the case
had the firearms law not been enacted." Ku, supra note 5, at 49. The Michigan study found,
among other things, that in Detroit's Recorders Court the gun law had little influence on the
probability of incarceration among those convicted, but the length of sentence was longer for
those that were sentenced to prison. See Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, supra note 3.
10 Articles and editorials in Detroit's two major daily newspapers reported that in the first
six months of 1976 (after the Florida law went into effect) armed robberies with firearms
dropped by 39%. New Gun Law Offers Hope in War on Crime, Detroit News, Dec. 28, 1976, at
B6; Neubacher supra note 8, at A3. But see Rothman, Gun law cuts Fla. crime but still is criticized,
Detroit News, Jan. 2, 1977, at A3 (referring to a "30% cutback in armed robberies"). Such
dramatic reports have not been limited to the news media; they are also found in scholarly
discussions of firearms policy. Hardy and Kates, for example, cited the same 39% reduction
in Florida firearms robberies that was mentioned in the Detroit newspapers. See Hardy &
Kates, Handgun Availability and the Social Harm of Robbery." Recent Data and Some Projections, in
RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 125 (D. Kates ed. 1979).
11 See generaly Loftin & McDowall, supra note 3; Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, supra
note 3.
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III. THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTE ON VIOLENT CRIME
The focus of the analysis is the development of an estimate of the
impact of the mandatory sentence on violent crimes such as robbery,
assault, and homicide. The estimates are derived from an interrupted
time-series design which we applied to three types of crimes in three
different Florida cities. The cities (Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville)
were selected because they are the largest in Florida, together account-
ing for a third or more of the total number of violent crimes in the
state,' 2 and because they are geographically separated and demographi-
cally distinct, providing three diverse opportunities to replicate the
analysis.
In each city, we gathered monthly data on the number of robberies,
assaults, and homicides committed by individuals with guns and with
other means.13 Several commentators have pointed out that although
interrupted time-series research designs are among the strongest of
quasi-experiments, there are a number of possible threats to the validity
of inferences drawn from them. 14 The most relevant of these threats for
our analysis is hitog,, the possibility that events occurring at about the
same time as the intervention were actually responsible for an observed
change.
In order to reduce historical threats, we used a control series for
each analysis. Armed robberies were compared to unarmed robberies;
gun assaults were compared to knife assaults; and gun homicides were
compared to nongun homicides.15 If an experimental series declined in
the post-intervention period while its control series remained stable, we
12 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1968 67, 171 (1969). Note, however, that by 1979, the percentage had dropped to
approximately 22 according to the FBI's figures. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1979 49, 95-96 (1980).
13 Homicide data for the period January 1968 through December 1978 were compiled
from Supplementary Homicide Report tapes provided by the Uniform Crime Reporting Di-
vision of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Robbery and assault data for the period
January 1967 through December 1980 were compiled from Return A tapes also provided by
the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Division. The assault series includes only aggravated as-
saults. Simple assaults are excluded from the analysis.
14 D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
FOR RESEARCH (1966); T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND
ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS (1979).
15 Initially, we attempted to use total nongun assaults, rather than knife assaults, as the
assault control series. The covariance structure between successive observations of the
nongun assault series, however, shifted over time, perhaps reflecting gradual change in report-
ing practices. A shifting covariance structure is a violation of the assumptions of ARIMA
modeling, see infra note 17 and accompanying text, and made the total assaults series
unanalyzable. We therefore substituted the knife assault series, which was not subject to this
problem. Although some of the other series exhibit a slightly shifting covariance structure, in
no case except total nongun assaults was it serious.
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concluded that the law had an effect. If both the experimental and con-
trol series declined, we concluded that the introduction of the law was
confounded with history. This method does not completely rule out al-
ternative explanations of a decline in the experimental series, but it does
make them less plausible.
Replication in different places under different conditions is also an
important means of ruling out historical artifacts. Interrupted time-se-
ries designs are given high credibility in the physical sciences, not only
because of experimental isolation, but also because the experiments are
repeated in many places under different circumstances. 1 6 Comparisons
between Detroit and the three Florida cities are therefore an important
part of our evaluation.
A visual examination of the data showed little evidence of the dra-
matic decline in gun crime that has been attributed to the Florida law.
In general, however, simple visual inspection of the crime time-series is
not very enlightening, and based upon such an inspection it is impossi-
ble to say whether or not the law had its intended effect.
In order to obtain more rigorous estimates of the impact of the law,
we analyzed the data as a set of interrupted time-series experiments.
1 7
This procedure begins with the development of an Autoregressive Inte-
grated Moving Average (ARIMA) noitse model to control for the effects of
nonstationarity and autocorrelation in the data. Autocorrelation and
nonstationarity represent the systematic forces driving the time-series
through the pre- and post-intervention periods, and they must be ac-
counted for by the noise model if incorrect inferences about the effects of
the intervention are to be avoided.
Once an appropriate noise model has been specified, an intervention
model is added to represent the effects of the gun law. A change in the
level of the series following the introduction of the law would show up in
the parameters of the intervention model. For each series, we consid-
ered three types of intervention models. These included an abrupt per-
manent change model, a gradual permanent change model, and an
abrupt temporary change model.' Although more complex interven-
tion models are possible, these three seemed reasonable, and did not re-
quire elaborate assumptions about patterns of impact. Taking
advantage of arithmetic relationships between the models, we were led
16 See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 14, at 42.
17 We used techniques developed by Box and Tiao. See generaly Box & Tiao, Intervention
Analysis with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems, 70 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 70
(1975); see also G. Box & G. JENKINS, TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL
(1976).
18 See D. MODOWALL, R. MCCLEARY, E. MEIDINGER & R. HAY, INTERRUPTED TIME











GUN HOMICIDE -0.8577 -1.9277 0.2123
NONGUN HOMICIDE 0.2009 -0.5287 0.9307
ARMED ROBBERY 6.8822 -14.1070 27.8710
UNARMED ROBBERY 2.5030 -2.0682 7.0742
GUN ASSAULT -5.6291 -21.1670 9.9086
KNIFE ASSAULT -2.8453 -14.2730 8.5828
TAMPA
GUN HOMICIDE -1.2084* -1.9589 -0.4580
NONGUN HOMICIDE 0.0329 -0.5007 0.5665
ARMED ROBBERY -4.1475 -19.9490 11.6540
UNARMED ROBBERY 8.5516* 1.9562 15.1470
GUN ASSAULT 9.7495* 3.4815 16.0180
KNIFE ASSAULT 7.8959 -3.8217 19.6130
MIAMI
GUN HOMICIDE -0.3441 -1.3922 0.7040
NONGUN HOMICIDE 0.8032 -0.0652 1.6716
ARMED ROBBERY -17.7520 -44.0070 8.5033
UNARMED ROBBERY 27.7420* 10.0880 45.3960
GUN ASSAULT -7.5774 -22.1950 7.0399
KNIFE ASSAULT -4.0525 -8.6878 5.8275
*Change significant with 95% confidence.
to the abrupt permanent change model as the most appropriate for each
of the series.
A summary of the results is presented in Table 1. Since the best
intervention model was the same for all series, we simply list the esti-
mate of the parameter (() that represents the shift in the level of the
series and its ninety-five percent confidence interval. The main conclu-
sion to be derived from the analysis is that there is little evidence that
the introduction of the Florida gun law was followed by a systematic
decline in violent gun crimes in the cities that we examined. Of the
eighteen series analyzed, only one, homicides with a gun in Tampa,
showed a statistically significant decline after the implementation of the
law. In three other cases there was a statistically significant increase in
1984]
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the series in the post-intervention period. One of these was a gun series
(gun assaults in Tampa) and two were control series (unarmed robberies
in Tampa and Miami).
Given this pattern of results, is there any coherent theory that could
be used to interpret the data as evidence that the statute reduced the
level of violent crime? The strongest finding is the decline in gun homi-
cides in Tampa. This type of decline in the gun, but not in the nongun,
series is exactly what we would expect to find if the gun law had a deter-
rent effect. Two other features of the data, however, make us cautious
in attributing the decline to the gun law. First, gun assaults, unlike
homicides, did not decline in any of the three cities. Assuming that
there are no reporting artifacts, it is unlikely that the gun law would
produce a decline in gun homicides without producing a similar decline
in gun assaults. There are, of course, complex theories that would rec-
oncile the results. 19 Perhaps there were various measurement artifacts.
Without additional information, such interpretations, though interest-
ing, are speculative.
Second, the decline in gun homicides occurred in only one of the
three cities. It would be risky to discount the negative findings in Jack-
sonville and Miami and attribute the decline in Tampa gun homicides
to the gun law. It is interesting, however, that the gun homicide series
was the only Detroit series that declined significantly after the Michigan
law was implemented. Also, a careful examination of Table 1 shows
that in Jacksonville and Miami; the signs of the intervention effects were
negative, though statistically not significant. This is admittedly limited
evidence that would not, by itself, sustain an argument for an interven-
tion effect, but it may turn out to be an important finding in an ac-
cumulating body of experience with policy experiments on mandatory
minimum sentencing.
The increase in unarmed robberies in Miami and Tampa suggests
two slightly different hypotheses: first, that offenders in Miami and
Tampa switched from armed to unarmed robbery, and second, that the
unarmed robbery series provides a measure of what wou ld have hap-
pened to the armed robberies were it not for the intervention effect of
the statute. Thus, the increase in unarmed robbery could be evidence of
a preventive effect of the law on armed robbery.
The first hypothesis, that offenders switched from armed to un-
armed robberies, can be dismissed quickly because it is inconsistent with
the data. Aside from the fact that the increase in unarmed robbery did
19 One theory is that the law influenced a subgroup of especially deadly gun assaults that
reduced the gun homicides, but not the gross level of gun assaults.
256 [Vol. 75
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not occur in Jacksonville, such a weapon switching hypothesis can be
ruled out because there was no reduction in the number of armed rob-
beries in Miami or Tampa. The rise in unarmed robberies cannot be
attributed to a weapons-switching effect of the statute unless there was a
compensating decline in unarmed robberies, and the analysis shows that
this was not the case. It is, of course, true that weapon switching, e.g.,
from gun to knife, could have occurred without detection in our analy-
sis. This, however, is a different issue that could not explain the rise in
unarmed robbery.
20
The second hypothesis is that the difference in the behavior of the
armed robbery series and the unarmed robbery series can be interpreted
as a measure of the intervention effect. The increase in unarmed rob-
beries while armed robberies remained at the same level in two of the
three cities might imply that the statute prevented an increase in armed
robberies that otherwise would have taken place.
The validity of this hypothesis depends on the assumption that the
unarmed robbery series is an adequate control for the armed robberies.
More precisely, the assumption is that factors that influence the two se-
ries, other than the statute, are not systematically related to the inter-
vention, and that, except for the statute, armed and unarmed robberies
are subject to similar exogenous forces across the study period. This is a
strong assumption, given what we know about the character of armed
and unarmed robbery. At this point, the prudent conclusion seems to be
that the data are not inconsistent with the model in which the gun law
prevented armed robberies from rising in Tampa and Miami. It should
be treated as a hypothesis with tentative support in two of the three
Florida cities.
The interpretation of the assault data is much simpler. Since the
only significant change was an increase in gun assaults in Tampa, there
is no reasonable theory that would imply that the gun law reduced vio-
lent assaults. Our interpretation is, therefore, that the law had no pre-
ventive effects for assaults. The rise in gun assaults in Tampa is
probably unrelated to the gun law, but one possible interpretation is
that the publicity associated with the law led to an increase in the re-
porting of gun assaults. 21 Since the increase occurred in only one of the
three cities, it is probably unrelated to the law.
20 Since weapon-specific robbery data were not available until January 1975, it is not
possible to do an appropriate statistical test of the hypothesis of weapon switching (gun to
knife or other weapon) within the armed robbery series. A visual inspection of the weapon-
specific robbery data after January 1975, however, does not indicate any increase in the rob-
beries with weapons other than guns in the post-intervention period.
2t Pierce and Bowers report that gun assaults without battery rose in Boston after a law
requiring a mandatory one-year sentence for illegally carrying a firearm was implemented.
While there is no direct evidence indicating a change in citizen reporting, they suggest that
1984]
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V. CONCLUSION
The analysis leads us to two conclusions. First, the enthusiastic ini-
tial reports announcing the sweeping success of the Florida law in reduc-
ing violent gun crimes such as robbery and assault were overly
optimistic. The results of our analysis are complex, but they are clearly
inconsistent with a model in which violent gun crimes uniformly de-
clined. Indeed, in only one of the nine gun crime series examined was
there a significant decline.
Second, although it is possible to construct a theory that would ac-
count for the pattern of results and still attribute some deterrent effect to
the Florida law, the very complexity of the theory challenges its credibil-
ity. It lacks parsimony and attains consistency with the facts only at the
expense of ad hoc exceptions. The theory requires that one attribute the
decline in gun homicides in Tampa to the law, but discount the lack of
an effect in Jacksonville and Miami; that one interpret the failure of
armed robberies to decline in Tampa and Miami as evidence of a pre-
ventive effect because unarmed robberies increased, but to ignore the
same finding in Jacksonville because unarmed robberies did not rise;
and finally, that one put aside the failure of any of the gun assault series
to decline or knife assault series to rise. Additional hypotheses about
measurement artifacts could also be added to account for such dissident
findings as the rise in gun assaults in Tampa. The appropriate conclu-
sion is not that these hypotheses are either correct or incorrect, but that
they are interesting speculations subject to further testing and
examination.
Our current working hypothesis, and by far the simplest interpreta-
tion of the data, is that the Florida gun law did not have a measurable
deterrent effect on violent crime. Not only does this interpretation pro-
vide a good fit to the data from both Detroit and Florida, but it is also
quite plausible on purely logical grounds. Legally and behaviorally, the
scope of this type of law is narrow. It applies only to individuals who
actually commit a felony using a gun. A citizen who possesses a gun for
protection and who does not anticipate using it in a crime is not af-
fected. The target of the law is the offender who chooses whether or not
to use a gun when committing a particular offense, or whether or not to
carry it opportunistically. In this narrow context, the marginal effect of
the threat of a three-year increment in a sentence would be small for two
reasons. First, the underlying felony already carries the threat of a sen-
tence that is much greater than three years; therefore, the increment in
potential sentence length is relatively small. Second, for most offenders
this is a likely explanation. See generally Pierce & Bowers, The Bartley-Fox Gun Law's Short-Term
Impact on Crime in Boston, 455 ANNALS 120 (1981).
[Vol. 75
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the threat of a three-year sentence is more than offset by the value of the
gun both in committing the offense and in providing protection. The
mandatory sentence would have its greatest deterrent effect on offenders
who do not place much value on the use of a gun, but who might, for
situational reasons, carry one while committing an offense.
22
The point is that even in the theoretical world, where a clear and
credible threat of a three-year mandatory sentence is communicated to a
group of utility-maximizing offenders, the marginal effect would be
small. If we add to this the usual noise and friction associated with the
real world, such as incomplete information, impulsive behavior, and
doubt about the credibility of the threat, it is quite plausible that the
gun law would have negligible deterrent effects.
Statutes providing a mandatory sentence for felonies committed
with a firearm are appealing because they appear to offer a way of re-
ducing gun violence at little cost to the public. Our analysis of the Flor-
ida experience, however, provides evidence that, as in Michigan, this
type of gun control policy does not in fact produce the promised reduc-
tions in violent crime.
22 Interviews conducted with a sample of convicted felons in Florida prisons in the spring
of 1977 support this interpretation. See generally BURR, supra note 7. Seventy-three percent of
the 277 respondents indicated that they would not be deterred from carrying a gun by the
mandatory sentence. The typical reason given for continuing to carry a gun was that they
needed it for protection and would rather take the chance of being arrested for possession of
an illegal weapon than to be found by their friends and associates without one. Another
typical response was that when you are committing a felony that carries a penalty of 10 to 20
years anyway, an extra three years is not significant. Id. at 23-24.
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